Cheating on the Middle East with China

I am cheating on the Middle East today and having a scandalous affair with China and the US strategy in place or rather, the continuing status quo in the region. There is an insightful and balanced article in this month's edition of Current History by David Shambaugh ("A New China Requires a New US Strategy") that outlines US insufficiency in the region and possible steps forward for correction. Unfortunately this article is not viewable online unless you have a subscription to the digital version Current History (another extra 10 bucks for print subscribers...geez). He notes, and I agree, that one of the more alarming dynamics of the relationship occurs between the two sides militaries and intelligence agencies. Both sides are currently in a reactive cycle of interpreting the each other's defense for offense and so on. The cycle is dangerous and might eventually spin out of control.

I am no stranger to China paranoia and the anxiety caused by constantly observing their military development, particularly in the form of Anti Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) and Ballistic Missile capabilities. Their military actions do not seem to mesh with their diplomatic rhetoric. "Recent Chinese actions -- including the denial of safe harbor for U.S. naval ships, the surfacing of an attack submarine within striking distance of American warships, the buzzing of a Japanese navy ship by a Chinese helicopter in waters close to Japan, and the harassment of the USNS Impeccable, among others -- have all contributed to this dynamic" (Abraham Denmark and Zachary Hosford). However, the question in the back of my mind has always been whether or not we are fueling their reactions and vice versa in a vicious cycle. Of course this dynamic occurs somewhat but to what extent? Are we driving ourselves towards a confrontation? What is the US national strategy on China? What does the US want China to look like in the future? Regardless of some of these goals, there are some factors that the US should accept. Most of these go along with Shambaugh's article. 

Regardless of all the talk about the "China bubble" as one of my Japanese colleagues calls it, China is going to continue in economic growth. Perhaps the population crisis (also discussed in this month's Current History by Wang Feng) will come into play later down the road but China is not the only country dealing with an aging population issue. The young, cheap, labor market will perhaps not be an option for them in the future but this is not necessarily an inherent show stopper. So, China is going to keep growing economically. It is already a regional power in Asia and and is a rising global actor though not necessarily a truly global power. In fact, most of China's ambitions outside of its desire for natural resources seem to center around making itself THE power in SE Asia, extending into the South China Sea and the Pacific. This focus is still somewhat regional and not yet one of a power trying to seek global dominance. However, China is certainly not fully cooperating or approving of the current international systems and laws in place today and has not completely joined the community as a true team player. As many people point out, they may try to be a "revisionist" power in this Western dominated arena. In my opinion, this is where the most important "battlefield" with China is located. In light of China's status these days, the US should probably stop its general parental and patronizing attitude it often has in the international arena. China needs to be treated with respect (and caution) and as a global actor. It needs to have an excuse to come out of its "victimization" complex.

I agree with Shambaugh in that the contention over Taiwan is no longer a truly relevant issue. As he says, "game over." Taiwan and China are going to keep warming towards each other in the future. Taiwan's President actually said this year, "we will never ask the United States to fight for Taiwan." Maybe we should stop selling weapons to Taiwan and make China happy at least on that front. I am not sure we would be losing more than we would gain. I believe the US eventually wants to build mutual trust and agreement with China so that they are content with their inclusion and role within the international system. 

Returning to my original point, the cycle playing out between US and China militaries and intelligence communities is particularly worrisome. How do we stop this cycle from continuing? While I am much too cautious to advocate a cessation in our activity in the South China Sea (as Shambaugh recommends) it would be beneficial to take some baby steps in cooperation between navies, etc. We all care about anti-piracy and maritime security operations off the Horn of Africa. China has actually deployed assets from its Navy (a new move for them) to help with operations off of Somalia. Perhaps through interaction and mutual cooperation in arenas such as maritime security, US and China military personnel can build professional relationships and even a little trust. Maybe some damage can be done on the stereotypes that persist on each side. I am always an advocate of people-to-people interaction. In the end, this is where the real world actually happens. 

We can all make grand sweeping narratives, theories, and strategies about resolving international issues, but ultimately execution of strategy, relationships, and actual events occur at the "people-level." Just as US diplomats have become accustomed to working with their Chinese counterparts, it is probably time that the US military did some of the same so that communication can actually occur and either side can correct the deviation from reality that naturally takes place when two entities do not communicate. While we may not like each other or like what we see, we will more than likely have a more accurate perception about military intentions. We might even build that tiniest seed of trust between people that slowly develops into something more fruitful. 

Now, back to the Middle East.